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In this work, we study the problem of online mechanism design for resources allocation and pricing in cloud
computing (RAPCC). We show that in general the allocation problems in RAPCC are NP-hard, and therefore
we focus on designing dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) mechanisms with good competitive
ratios compared to the offline optimal allocation (with the prior knowledge about the future jobs). We propose
two kinds of DSIC online mechanisms. The first mechanism, which is based on a greedy allocation rule and
leverages a priority function for allocation, is very fast and has a tight competitive bound. We discuss several
priority functions including exponential and linear priority functions, and show that the former one has a
better competitive ratio. The second mechanism, which is based on a dynamic program for allocation, also
has a tight competitive ratio and performs better than the first one when the maximum demand of cloud
customers is close to the capacity of the cloud provider.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and Behavioral Sciences-
Economics
General Terms: Economics, Theory
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Online mechanism design, competitive analysis, incentive compatible
1. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is transforming today’s IT industry. It offers fast and flexible pro-
visioning of online-accessible computational resources to its customers, thus greatly
increases the plasticity and reduces the cost of IT infrastructure. In a cloud computing
platform, different kinds of resources are provided to customers, including computing
power, storage, bandwidth, database, software, and analytic tools. The statistical mul-
tiplexing necessary to achieve elasticity and the illusion of infinite capacity require
each of these resources to be virtualized to hide their implementation details. There-
fore, a main approach to sell cloud computing resources is through virtual machines
(also referred to as instances): customers can buy and pay for a certain number of
virtual machines according to the time of utilization.
A practical problem faced by a cloud service provider is how to appropriately allocate
resources and charge customers so as to achieve a balance between profit making and
customer satisfaction. Weinhardt et al., [2009] even claimed that the success of cloud
computing in the IT market can be obtained by sorely developing adequate pricing
techniques.
1.1. Existing Pricing Schemes in Cloud Computing
The most commonly-used pricing scheme in today’s cloud computing market is the so-
called pay-as-you-gomodel, with which customers pay a fixed price per unit of usage.
[ Amazon EC2] utilizes this model and charges a fixed price for each hour of virtual
machine usage. Other leading cloud computing products such as [ Windows Azure]
and [ Google AppEngine] also support this pricing model.
Subscription is another commonly employed pricing scheme in cloud computing,
with which a customer pays in advance for the services he/she is going to receive for a
pre-defined period of time, with a pre-defined fixed price.
Both the pay-as-you-go and subscription models belong to fixed-price mechanisms
with which customers play a passive role. Fixed-price mechanisms are easy to imple-
ACM XXXX, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
A:2 T. Liu et al.
ment. However, they may not be optimal in terms of resource utilization since the
demands are dynamically changing. For example, in peak hours, suppose all the re-
sources have been taken by some customers; then even if a new costumer has an
emergent task, he/she cannot get the desired resources no matter how much he/she
is willing to pay. In this regard, dynamic and market-based pricing mechanisms are
better choices in regulating the supply-demand relationship at market equilibria, and
providing satisfactory resource allocation compatible to economic incentives.
As a quick and efficient approach to selling goods at market value, auction-style
pricing mechanisms have been widely applied in many fields, reflecting the underlying
trends in demand and supply. In fact, an auction-style pricing mechanism has been
adopted by Amazon to dynamically allocate spot instances1 to potential customers. The
main advantage of spot instance lies in that it can greatly save the cost of customers
because the spot price is usually far below the fixed price. Its disadvantage is the
limited applicability, specifically only for those interruption-tolerant tasks: the spot
price will go up when more customers come in and a current running task may be
interrupted if its bid price is lower than the new spot price. This clearly closes the
door to more tasks that are not interruptible, and asks for new kinds of auction-style
pricing mechanisms to be invented. This is exactly our focus in this work.
1.2. Online Mechanism Design for Cloud Computing
In this paper we study the problem of designing dominant-strategy incentive com-
patible (DSIC) mechanisms for resource allocation and pricing in cloud computing
(RAPCC). In particular, we consider a specific setting of auctions as shown below, which
can reflect the nature of cloud computing and distinguish our work from previous stud-
ies on auction mechanism design. Please note that designing auction mechanisms in
this setting is generally difficult since it combines the challenges of mechanism design
(i.e., ensuring incentive compatibility) with the challenges of online algorithms (i.e.,
dealing with uncertainty about future inputs) [Hajiaghayi et al. 2005].
(1) A cloud provider has a fixed capacity (denoted as C ∈ N), i.e., a fixed number of
virtual machines (referred to as instances) in an infinite time interval T = [0,∞).
(2) Customers come and go over time. Each cloud customer has a job to run in the
cloud. On behalf of a cloud customer, an agent submits his/her job to the cloud.2
(3) An online mechanism is used to determine how to allocate the instances to the
agents and how to charge them, without knowledge of future agents who will sub-
sequently arrive.
(4) The mechanism is designed to be incentive compatible and to (approximately) max-
imize the efficiency (social welfare) of the cloud computing system.
To be more specific, we explain the details of the above setting as follows.
We use J to represent the set of jobs. Let ri be the release time of job i and di be
the deadline of the job. The private information (i.e., type) of agent i is characterized
by a tuple ωi = (ni, li, vi) ∈ Ω, where ni is the number of instances required by the
job, li is the length of time required by running the job, and vi is the value that the
agent can get if the job is completed. Here we say a job i is complete if it is allocated
with at least ni instances for li units of time continuously between its release time ri
and deadline di. The space Ω consists of all possible agent types. Note that types are
private information: agent i observes its type only at time ri, and nothing is known
about the job before ri.
1http://aws.amazon.com/ec2/purchasing-options/spot-instances/
2Since customer, job, and agent have one-to-one correspondence in our setting, we will use these terms
interchangeably in the following sections of this paper.
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Note that in our setting, interruption of jobs is allowed but the interrupted job gets
zero value. Once a job is interrupted, the resources already spent on the job are wasted:
when the job is restarted, another li units of time will be needed for its completion.
Partial allocation is not legitimate, i.e., allocating xi instances to agent i is useless if
xi < ni. The deadline of each job is hard, which means that no value is obtained for a
job that is completed after its deadline.
Similar to [Ng et al. 2003], we do not consider agents’ temporal strategies and as-
sume that agents will not misreport ri and di in this work. We leave agents’ temporal
strategies to future work. For convenience, we usually combine ri, di with ωi and de-
note them by θi, i.e., θi = (ri, di, ni, li, vi).
In practice, a cloud platform usually specifies the shortest and longest lengths of a
job, and directly rejects those jobs whose lengths are out of this range. To reflect this
and without loss of generality, we assume the minimum and maximum length of a job
to be 1 and κ respectively. For the convenience of analysis, we assume κ is an integer.
We study direct revelation mechanisms [Myerson 1981], in which each agent par-
ticipates by simply reporting his/her type. Please note that agents are selfish and
rational. Therefore, they may misreport their type in order to be better off. We use
θˆi= (ri, di, nˆi, lˆi, vˆi) to represent agent i’s report. It is easy to see that the misreport of
a shorter length is a dominated strategy; otherwise, his/her job cannot be completed
when the provider allocates nˆi instances with time length lˆi < li. Therefore, we assume
that agents will not misreport a shorter length. Based on the reports of the agents, the
mechanism determines how to allocate and price the computing resources.
Let x be an allocation function and xi(t) be the number of instances allocated to job
i ∈ I(t) at time t, where I(t) is the set of jobs available to the mechanism at time t.
We say x is feasible if
∑
i∈I(t) xi(t) ≤ C, ∀t. For a job i and an allocation function x,
let qi(x) = 1 if it is completed, otherwise qi(x) = 0. The value of agent i extracted
from allocation x is qi(x)vi. The efficiency (social welfare) of the allocation function x is
W (x) =
∑
i qi(x)vi.
Let p be a payment rule and pi be the amount of money agent i needs to pay to
the cloud service provider. We assume that agents have quasi-linear utilities, i.e., the
utility of agent i for the allocation function x and the payment rule p is ui(x, p) =
qi(x)vi − pi.
A mechanismM = (x, p) is said to be dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DSIC)
if, for any agent i, regardless of the behaviors of other agents, truthfully reporting
his/her own type can maximize his/her utility. The mechanism is said to be individual
rational if for each job i, ui(x, p) ≥ 0.
Hajiaghayi et al. [2005] provide a simple characterization for DSIC mechanisms by
monotonicity, which is rephrased as Lemma 1.2.
Definition 1.1. We say that a type θi = (ri, di, ni, li, vi) dominates the type θ
′
i =
(r′i, d
′
i, n
′
i, l
′
i, v
′
i), denoted θi ≻ θ′i if ri ≤ r′i, di ≥ d′i, ni ≤ n′i, li ≤ l′i, and vi > v′i.
An allocation function x is monotone if for every agent i, we have qi(xi(θi, θ−i)) ≥
qi(xi(θ
′
i, θ−i)), ∀θi ≻ θ′i, ∀θ−i.
LEMMA 1.2. [Hajiaghayi et al. 2005] For any allocation function x, there exists a
payment rule p such that the mechanism (x, p) is DSIC if and only if x is monotone.
We are interested in designing DSIC and individual rational mechanisms. In addi-
tion, we also would like the mechanism to have good performance in (approximately)
maximizing the social welfare of the cloud computing system.
In particular, we use the concept of competitive ratio [Lavi and Nisan 2000] to eval-
uate the performance of a mechanism (see Definition 1.3), which compares the social
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welfare implemented by the mechanism (without any knowledge of future jobs) with
that of the optimal offline allocation (with the prior knowledge of future jobs).
Definition 1.3. An online mechanism M is (strictly) c-competitive if there does not
exist an job sequence θ such that c · W (M, θ) < OPT (θ), where OPT (θ) denotes the
social welfare of the optimal offline allocation. Sometimes we also say that M has a
competitive ratio of c.
1.3. Our Results
The main results of our work are summarized as follows.
(1) (Section 2) We show that the allocation problem in our setting is NP-hard through
a reduction from the Knapsack problem to our problem.
(2) (Section 3) We design a DSIC mechanism ΓG based on the greedy algorithm pro-
posed for the Knapsack problem [Vazirani 2001]. In ΓG, we assign a priority score
to each active job and then allocate resources based on the virtual values of the
active jobs computed from priority scores. We study several different priority func-
tions and obtain the following results.
(a) When assigning priorities according to an exponential function, the competitive
ratio of ΓG is tightly bounded by
h
h−1 · χ1−χ−1/κ + 1 when h ≥ 2, where h is the
rounded ratio between the capacity C and the maximum number of instances
demanded by a customer, and χ > 1 is the base of the exponential function.
Specifically, when we choose χ = (κ+1κ )
κ, ΓG achieves the best competitive ratio
of hh−1 · (κ + 1)(1 + 1κ)κ + 1. And for the special case with the capacity C = 1
(which is identical to the conventional online real-time scheduling problem),
the competitive ratio of ΓG is tightly bounded by
χ
1−χ−1/κ
+ 1.
(b) When assigning priorities according to a linear function, the competitive ratio
of ΓG is lower bounded by
h
h−1 ·(
√
2κ(κ+ 1)+ 32κ+
1
2 )+1. This result implies that
the exponential priority is better than the linear priority, since
√
2κ(κ+ 1) +
3
2κ+
1
2 is greater than (κ+ 1)(1 +
1
κ )
κ.
(c) When assigning priorities according to a general non-decreasing function f(δ),
the competitive ratio of ΓG is lower bounded by
h
h−1 · (
√
κ+ 1)2 + 1, when f(δ)
satisfies f(0) = 1, where δ is the completed fraction of a job.
(3) (Section 4) We design another DSIC mechanism ΓD based on the dynamic program
proposed for the Knapsack problem [Martello and Toth 1990]. This mechanism has
a competitive ratio of exactly nmax · χ1−χ−1/κ +1, where nmax is the maximum number
of instances demanded by a customer. Comparing the ΓG, this mechanism has a
much better competitive ratio when nmax is close to the capacity C.
1.4. Related Work
[Lavi and Nisan 2000] coined the term “online auction” and initiated the study of in-
centive compatible mechanisms in dynamic environments with the computer science
literature. [Friedman and Parkes 2003] initiated the study of VCG-based online mech-
anisms and coined the term “online mechanism design”. Later on, MDP-based ap-
proaches [Parkes and Singh 2003; Parkes et al. 2004] have been applied to study the
online VCG mechanism, in which prior knowledge is assumed about the future ar-
rivals. Different from those works, the online setting concerned here is model-free (i.e.,
no knowledge is assumed about future), since cloud computing is a very dynamic envi-
ronment and it is difficult to predict future jobs, especially in the auction-style setting.
Model-free online setting has been studied in [Porter 2004; Hajiaghayi et al. 2005],
which design DSIC mechanisms for online scheduling of a single, re-usable resource.
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A competitive ratio of (
√
k + 1)2 + 1 is achieved with respect to the optimal efficiency
in [Porter 2004], where k is the ratio of maximum to minimum value density (value
divided by processing time) of a job, and the ratio is proved to be optimal for determin-
istic mechanisms. [Hajiaghayi et al. 2005] provided a randomized mechanism whose
efficiency competitive ratio is O(log(κ)) (recall that κ is the ratio of the maximum job
length to the minimum job length. Unlike these works, in our problem, we have mul-
tiple instances to sell at each time step and each job demands multiple instances and
multi-unit time.
Recently, [Gerding et al. 2011; Robu et al. 2012, 2013] studied online mechanisms
for electric vehicle charging. In this problem, agents are assumed to be with multi-
unit demand and non-increasing marginal values. That is, the first unit allocated to
an agent have a higher (or equal) marginal value for the agent compared to any subse-
quent units. The difference between those works and our model lies in the definition of
agents’ utilities: in our problem an agent can get value if and only if his/her job is fully
completed, while in their problems, an agent can collect value even if his/her demand
is only partially fulfilled. Note that our setting is closer to cloud computing, in which
agents want their jobs fully completed. Therefore, the mechanisms designed in those
works do not work for our problem.
Another related work is [Ng et al. 2003], which studied the problem of designing
fast and incentive-compatible exchanges for dynamic resource allocation problems in
distributed systems. Different from our work, they considered a two-sided market, in
which there are both request agents (consuming resources) and service agents (pro-
viding resources) coming sequentially. Their setting on the side of request agents is
very similar to us: they ignored the temporal strategies and considered a three dimen-
sional type (i.e., size of the job, length of the time, and the value of the job) for request
agents. Because their model is more complex and needs to consider both the strategies
of buyer side and seller side, they focused on designing incentive compatible mecha-
nisms without theoretical analysis on the efficiency of the mechanism. In contrast, we
design DSIC mechanisms for our problem and (almost) tight competitive bounds are
obtained.
2. COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY
Before presenting our mechanisms, we first consider the computational complexity of
the allocation problem in our model.
THEOREM 2.1. The allocation problem in our model is NP-hard. More precisely,
the decision problem of whether the optimal allocation has social welfare of at least k
(where k is an additional part of the input) is NP-complete.
PROOF. We show that any knapsack problem can be reduced to the allocation prob-
lem in our model.
Consider a knapsack with size C ∈ Z+ and a set of items denoted as S = {1, . . . , n}.
Each item i in the set has size si ∈ Z+ and profit vi ∈ R+. The knapsack problem is
whether one can pack a subset of items into the knapsack with total profit greater than
k.
Given such an instance of knapsack problem, we will build a cloud resource alloca-
tion problem from it as follows: A cloud provider has C virtual machines. There are
n agents, and agent i’s type is θi = {0, 1, si, 1, vi}. Now notice that a yes/no answer to
the decision problem of the cloud resource allocation corresponds to a yes/no answer to
the decision problem of knapsack problem, and vice versa. Since the knapsack prob-
lem is NP-complete, this concludes the NP-hardness of the allocation problem in cloud
computing.
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3. A GREEDY MECHANISM
In this section, we design a greedy mechanism for resource allocation and pricing in
cloud computing (RAPCC) and prove its competitive efficiency.
For any time t, we use δi ≤ 1 to denote the fraction that job i has been continuously
processed before time t (i.e. he/she has received an allocation at time t − δili and has
not been interrupted after that), and we call δi the rate of completeness. We say a job i
is feasible at time t if
(1) it has been released before t, i.e., ri ≤ t;
(2) it has enough time to be completed before its deadline, i.e., di − t ≥ (1− δi)li; and
(3) it has not been completed yet, i.e., δi < 1.
We use JF (t) to denote the set of feasible jobs at t.
The basic idea of the proposed mechanism is that we assign a priority score to each
feasible job, compute a virtual value for each feasible job, allocate the resources to the
feasible jobs according to their virtual values at each critical time point, and charge
each agent at his/her deadline according to his/her critical value [Porter 2004] if his/her
job is completed. We say t is a critical time point if some new job arrives at time t
or some existing job is completed at time t. Given an allocation function, the critical
value of a job is the minimum reported value that ensures it can be completed by its
deadline. Note that we do not charge an agent if his/her job is not completed before
his/her deadline.
ALGORITHM 1: The greedy allocation rule of ΓG
for all critical time point t in the ascending order do
JF ← JF (t);
∀i ∈ JF , update its virtue value density ρ
′
i =
vi
ni
f(δi) and virtue value v
′
i = vif(δi);
Re-number jobs in JF by the descending order of ρ
′
i;
if there exists k such that the size of the first k jobs exceeds C then
if
∑
k−1
i=1
v′i ≥ v
′
k then
Run the job set{1, . . . , k − 1} ;
else
Run job k;
end
else
Run the job set JF ;
end
end
The allocation rule3 of mechanism ΓG is shown in Algorithm 1, in which f() is a
non-decreasing priority function satisfying f(0) = 1.
There can be different ways to assign priority scores to jobs. We study three priority
functions in the following subsections.
3.1. Exponential Priority Functions
In this subsection, we study the mechanism ΓG with an exponential priority function:
f(δ) = χδ,
where χ > 1 is an input parameter.
It is easy to see that with such a priority function, the allocation rule is monotone.
According to Lemma 1.2, the mechanism ΓG is dominant-strategy incentive compati-
ble.
3Since the payment rule is very simple, we omit it.
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Next, we prove a tight competitive ratio for the mechanism.
THEOREM 3.1. Assume C ≥ h · nmax, where h ≥ 2 is an integer. The competitive
ratio of ΓG with an exponential priority function is
h
h−1 · χ1−χ−1/κ + 1.
We prove the theorem with two lemmas. First, we use an example to prove the com-
petitive ratio of ΓG is at least
h
h−1 · χ1−χ−1/κ +1. Then, we prove the competitive ratio is
upper bounded by hh−1 · χ1−χ−1/κ + 1.
LEMMA 3.2. The competitive ratio of ΓG with an exponential priority function is at
least hh−1 · χ1−χ−1/κ + 1.
PROOF. We prove this lemma by an example. For the convenience of analysis, we
assume κ is an integer. Consider an example with C = h · nmax and two types of jobs:
long and short. The length of long jobs is κ, while the length of short jobs is 1. The jobs
are released by groups. Let p be a large integer, and we have p+ 1 groups of long jobs
and pκ groups of short jobs, respectively.
The first group of long jobs (denoted as J l0) consists of h long jobs with type θ
l
0 =
(0, κ, nmax, κ, nmax).
The (i + 1)-th group of long jobs (denoted as J li ) consists of h long jobs with type
θli = (i(κ− ǫ), (i + 1)κ, nmax, κ, nmax · χi), where p− 2 ≥ i ≥ 1.
The p-th group of long jobs (denoted as J lp−1) consists of h − 1 long jobs with types
θl1p−1 = ((p − 1)(κ − ǫ), (p + 2)κ, nmax, κ, nmax · χp−1), and one long job with type θl2p−1 =
((p− 1)(κ− ǫ), (p+ 2)κ, 1, κ, χp−1).
The (p + 1)-th group of long jobs (denoted as J lp) consists of h long jobs with type
θlp = (p(κ− ǫ), (p+ 1)κ, nmax, κ, nmax · χp−ǫ − δ).
Here ǫ and δ are small constants satisfying pǫ≪ 1 and δ ≪ ǫ.
In the meanwhile, we have pκ groups of short jobs as follows.
The (j + 1)-th group of short jobs (denoted as Jjs ) consists of h short jobs with types
θjs = (j, j + 1, nmax, 1, nmax · (χj/κ − δ/κ)). Here j = 0, 1, . . . , pκ− 1.
It can be verified that only the jobs in group J lp−1 can be completed in themechanism,
with a social welfare ∼ ((h− 1) · nmax + 1)χp−1. While in the optimal allocation, all the
short jobs will be completed, and after that, group J lp and group J
l
p−1 will be completed
successively, with a social welfare ∼ h ·nmax
∑pκ−1
j=0 χ
j/k + h ·nmax ·χp+((h− 1) ·nmax+
1)χp−1 = h ·nmax · 1−χ
p+1/κ
1−χ1/κ
+((h− 1) ·nmax+1)χp−1. Therefore, the competitive ratio of
our mechanism is at least h·nmax(h−1)·nmax+1 ·
1−χp+1/κ
(1−χ1/κ)χp−1
+1 = h·nmax(h−1)·nmax+1 ·
χ−χ−1/κ−p+1
1−χ−1/κ
+1,
which tends to hh−1 · χ1−χ−1/κ + 1, when p→∞ and nmax →∞.
LEMMA 3.3. The competitive ratio of ΓG with an exponential priority function is at
most hh−1 · χ1−χ−1/κ + 1.
PROOF. Similar to [Hajiaghayi et al. 2005], we will charge the values of winning
jobs in an optimal allocation (denoted as OPT) to winning jobs in our mechanism.
Here a winning job in an allocation means the job is completed in the allocation. We
assume, without loss of generality, that OPT does not interrupt any job.
We draw a line ℓ which represents a capacity of h−1h C instances (Fig. 1). For any
winning agent i in OPT, if he/she is also a winner in our mechanism, then his/her value
is charged to himself/herself. Otherwise, consider the time t at which i is allocated the
instances in OPT. At this time, our mechanism allocates at least h−1h C instances to
agents, since nmax ≤ Ch and i is not allocated. We sort the jobs (denote Ji) that are
ACM XXXX, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
A:8 T. Liu et al.
Fig. 1. The line ℓ which represents the capacity of h−1
h
C
allocated at time t by decreasing order of vini · χδi . We let job 1 (after sorting) get the
bottom n1 instances, job 2 is allocated above job 1, and so forth. Using Jit ⊆ Ji to denote
the set of jobs that are allocated under the line ℓ (if the line cuts some job j ∈ Ji, we only
consider the part that under ℓ and use j′ to represent this part). We first temporarily
charge the value of i to all the jobs in Jit, then each job j ∈ Jit is temporarily charged
njh
(h−1)C vi (≤ nih(h−1)C v′j). A job j ∈ Jit might be interrupted in our algorithm. If he/she is
not interrupted, then he/she is finally charged
njh
(h−1)C vi. If he/she is interrupted at time
t′, then some jobs that were under ℓ before t′ may be allocated above ℓ at t′. We use Jint
to denote all these jobs and jobs that are interrupted at t′. We pass all the temporary
charge of j ∈ Jint to jobs that are newly allocated under line ℓ at t′, and other jobs in
Jit\Jint keep their temporary charge.
Note that after the interruption the total value of jobs that under ℓ will not decrease,
since nmax ≤ Ch and jobs are sorted by decreasing of ρ′. Therefore, after the interrup-
tion, each job j under ℓ has a temporary charge of at most
njh
(h−1)C vi ≤ nih(h−1)C v′j . We
continue this chain until all the temporary charge are finally charged. We now calcu-
late the maximum total value charged to agent j with value vj who wins at time t in
our mechanism.
If job j is completed in OPT , there is a charge of vj . Divide all jobs in OPT whose
value is charged to j to different groups according to their start time in OPT by the
following rule:
Consider a job i in OPT whose value is charged to j. Let t′ = t − σi be the time at
which job i receives an allocation in OPT , then we say i is in group σi. It is clear from
the mechanism that σi > −lj .
When σi ≤ 0, it is easy to see that, the value of job i is at most χ−σi/lj nivjnj . Thus, the
total charge from group σi is at most
∑
i ni
vj
nj
njh
(h−1)Cχ
−σi/lj ≤ hh−1χ−σi/ljvj .
When σi > 0, we now claim that the value of i is at most χ
−σi/k nivj
nj
, and the reason
is as follows: When σi > 0, job i is released before j. There exists two scenarios which
make job i interrupted.
(1) Assume that job i is interrupted by job i2 after being allocated for σ
1
i units of time,
and then job i2 is interrupted by job i3 after σ
2
i units of time, and so on. The last job
in this chain is iτ which is interrupted by job j after σ
τ
i units of time. Then we know
from our mechanism that σ1i + σ
2
i + . . . + σ
τ
i = σi and
vi
ni
χσ
1
i /li ≤ vi2ni2 ,
vi2
ni2
χσ
2
i /li2 ≤
vi3
ni3
, . . ., and
viτ
niτ
χσ
τ
i /liτ ≤ vjnj , which combining with lmax = κ implies that vi ≤
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χ−σi/κ
nivj
nj
. Thus, the total charge from group σi is at most
∑
i ni
vj
nj
njh
(h−1)Cχ
−σi/κ ≤
h
h−1χ
−σi/κvj
(2) Assume that before job i is released, job i2 has been processed for z units of time,
then job i2 is interrupted by job i3 after σ
2
i units of time, and so on. The last job in
this chain is iτ which is interrupted by job j after σ
τ
i units of time. Then we know
from our mechanism that σ2i +σ
3
i +. . .+σ
τ
i = σi and
vi
ni
χ−z/li2 ≤ vi2ni2 ,
vi2
ni2
χ(z+σ
2
i )/li2 ≤
vi3
ni3
, . . ., and
viτ
niτ
χσ
τ
i /liτ ≤ vjnj , which combining with lmax = κ implies that vi ≤
χ−σi/κ
nivj
nj
. Thus, the total charge from group σi is at most
∑
i ni
vj
nj
njh
(h−1)Cχ
−σi/κ ≤
h
h−1χ
−σi/κvj
Also, the value of σi for any two such groups must be apart by at least lmin = 1, so
σi = −lj + i · 1, for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,+∞. Therefore, the total charge to j is at most
vj +
h
h− 1 ·
∞∑
i:σi≥0
χ−
σi
κ vj +
h
h− 1 ·
∑
i:σi<0
χ
−
σi
lj vj
≤vj + h
h− 1 ·
∞∑
i:σi=0
χ−
σi
κ vj +
h
h− 1 ·
i:σi=−1∑
i:σi=−κ
χ−
σi
κ vj
=(
h
h− 1 ·
χ
1− χ− 1κ + 1)vj
This shows that our algorithm is ( hh−1 · χ1−χ− 1κ + 1)-competitive.
Combining Lemma 3.2 and 3.3 completes the proof of Theorem 3.1.
The following lemma shows that if nmax → C, ΓG does not have a constant competi-
tive ratio.
LEMMA 3.4. The competitive ratio of ΓG with an exponential priority function can
be arbitrarily bad when nmax = C.
PROOF. Consider the following example: Let p be a large integer, ǫ and µ be small
constants satisfying pǫ ≪ 1 and µ ≪ ǫ. There are 4p jobs. Each job has zero laxity
and unit length, and their types are as follows. θ1 = θ2 = (0, 1,
C
2 , 1, 2
p), θ3 = (µ, µ +
1, C2 + 1, 1, 2
p + 2
p+1
C + ǫ), and θ4 = (2µ, 1 + 2µ,C, 1, 2
p + 2
p+1
C + 2ǫ). (we choose the
value density of job 3 “just” larger than job 1 and 2’s, and job 3 preempts job 1 and
2. Then we choose the value of job 4 “just” larger than job 3’s, and job 4 preempts job
3.) Generally, for i = 4j + 1 (p − 1 ≥ j ≥ 1), θi = θi+1 = (3jµ, 3jµ + 1, C2 , 1, vi−12 + ǫ),
θi+2 = ((3j+1)µ, (3j+1)µ+1,
C
2 +1, 1,
vi−1
2 +
vi−1
C +2ǫ), and θi+3 = ((3j+2)µ, (3j+2)µ+
1, C, 1, vi−12 +
vi−1
C +3ǫ). We can verify that in ΓG only the last job (i.e., job 4p) wins whose
value is about 2p+1(12 +
1
C )
p. While in OPT, the first two jobs win, and the social welfare
is 2p+1. Therefore the competitive ratio of ΓG with an exponential priority function is
at least (12 +
1
C )
p. As C is usually a large number in practical cloud computing, we can
assume C > 2 and have (12 +
1
C ) smaller than 1. Therefore, the competitive ratio tends
to infinity when p tends to infinity.
Remark 3.5. Fortunately, in the practice of cloud computing, the demand ni of an
individual cloud customer is usually much smaller than the capacity of the cloud, and
therefore the proposed mechanism is expected to perform well in real-world cloud com-
puting market.
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Now we consider a special case of our model, where C = nmax = 1. We have the
following theorem for this special case.
THEOREM 3.6. AssumeC = nmax = 1, ΓG obtains a tight competitive ratio
χ
1−χ−1/κ
+
1.
PROOF. We prove the theorem by charging the value of any completed job in an
optimal allocation (denoted as OPT ) to a completed job in our mechanism. For any
completed job i in OPT , if it is also completed in our mechanism, then its value is
charged to itself. Otherwise, consider the time t at which i is completed in OPT . At this
time, our mechanism has been processing another job j0. This job might be preempted
in our mechanism. If it is preempted, let j1 be the job that preempts it. We continue
this chain until we reach a job jk which is not preempted, and charge the value of job
i to this job.
We now calculate the maximum total value charged to a job j with value vj , which
is released at time t and will be completed in our mechanism. If job j is completed in
OPT , there is a charge of vj . Consider a job i in OPT whose value is charged to j. Let
t′ = t− σi be the time at which i is processed in OPT . Similar to proof of Theorem 3.1,
we easily know σi > −lj, and what’s more, when σi ≤ 0, the value of i is at most
χ−σi/ljvj , and when σi > 0, the value of i is at most χ
−σi/kvj ,
Also, the value of σi for any two such i’s must be apart by at least lmin = 1, so
σi = −lj + i · 1, for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,+∞. Therefore, the total charge to j is at most
vj +
∞∑
i:σi≥0
χ−
σi
κ vj +
h
h− 1 ·
∑
i:σi<0
χ
−
σi
lj vj
≤vj +
∞∑
i:σi=0
χ−
σi
κ vj +
h
h− 1 ·
i:σi=−1∑
i:σi=−κ
χ−
σi
κ vj
=(
χ
1 − χ− 1κ + 1)vj
This shows that our mechanism is ( χ
1−χ−1/κ
+ 1)-competitive.
We give an example below to show that the above analysis is tight. For the con-
venience of analysis, we assume κ is an integer and lmin = 1. In our example, there
are two types of jobs: long and short. The length of long jobs is κ, while the length
of short jobs is 1. Let p be a large integer, the number of long and short jobs are
p + 1 and pκ, respectively. The fist long job J l0 is released at time 0, and its type is
θl0 = (0, κ, 1, κ, 1). For p − 2 ≥ i ≥ 1, job J li has type θli = (i(κ − ǫ), (i + 1)κ, 1, κ, χi).
Job J lp has type θ
l
p = (p(κ − ǫ), (p + 1)κ, 1, κ, χp−ǫ − δ). Here, ǫ and δ are small con-
stants satisfying pǫ ≪ 1 and δ ≪ ǫ. We also have long job J lp−1, whose type is
θlp−1 = ((p − 1)(κ − ǫ), (p + 2)κ, 1, κ, χp−1 + δ). In the meanwhile, we have short jobs
as follows. For j = 0, 1, . . . , pκ− 1, we denote Jsj as the (j+1)th short job, whose type is
θsj = (j, j + 1, 1, 1, χ
j/κ − δ/κ). for j = 0, 1, . . . , pκ− 1.
It can be verified that only one job J lp−1 can be completed in our mechanism, with
a social welfare ∼ χp−1. While in optimal solution, all the short jobs will be com-
pleted, and after that, J lp and J
l
p+1 will be completed successively, with a social welfare
∼ 1−χ−1
1−χ−1/κ
(1+χ+, . . . ,+χp−1+χp)+χp−1. Therefore, the competitive ratio of our mech-
anism is at least 1−χ
−1
1−χ−1/κ
(χ−(p−1)+χ−(p−2), . . . ,+1+χ)+ 1, which tends to χ
1−χ−1/κ
+1,
when p→∞.
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In many situations, we know the maximum length κ of any job in advance (e.g.,
specified by the cloud provider), then our mechanism can choose a best χ to obtain the
best competitive ratio. we have the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 3.7. If κ is known, when χ = (κ+1κ )
κ, the mechanism ΓG obtains the
best competitive ratio. When C ≥ h·nmax, where h ≥ 2 is an integer, this competitive ratio
is hh−1 ·(κ+1)(1+ 1κ )κ+1. When C = nmax = 1, this competitive ratio is (κ+1)(1+ 1κ )κ+1.
3.2. General Non-decreasing Priority Functions
We consider any general non-decreasing priority function, and show that the competi-
tive ratio of ΓG is greater than (
√
κ+ 1)2 + 1. We present an example here.
Example 3.8. There are two types of jobs: long and short. The length of long jobs
is κ, while the length of short jobs is 1. Let p be a large integer, the number of long
and short jobs are p+ 1 and pκ, respectively. The fist long job J l0 is released at time 0,
and its type is θl0 = (0, κ, 1, κ, 1). For p − 2 ≥ i ≥ 1, job J li has type θli = (i(κ − ǫ), (i +
1)κ, 1, κ, f i(1)). Job J lp has type θ
l
p = (p(κ− ǫ), (p+ 1)κ, 1, κ, fp−1(1) · f(1− ǫ)− δ). Here,
ǫ and δ are small constants satisfying pǫ ≪ 1 and δ ≪ ǫ. We also have long job J lp−1,
whose type is θlp−1 = ((p−1)(κ−ǫ), (p+2)κ, 1, κ, fp−1(1)+δ). In the meanwhile, we have
short jobs as follows. For j = 0, 1, . . . , pκ − 1, we denote Jsj as the (j + 1)th short job,
whose type is θsj = (j, j + 1, 1, 1, f
⌊j/κ⌋(1) · f(j/κ− ⌊j/κ⌋)− δ/κ). for j = 0, 1, . . . , pκ− 1.
It can be verified that only one job J lp−1 can be completed in our mechanism, with
a social welfare ∼ fp−1(1). While in an optimal allocation, all the short jobs will
be completed, and after that, J lp and J
l
p−1 will be completed successively, with a so-
cial welfare ∼ (f(0) + f( 1κ )+, . . . ,+f(κ−1κ )) · (1 + . . . + fp−1(1)) + fp(1) + fp−1(1) ≥
κ · (1 + f(1)+, . . . ,+fp−1(1)) + fp(1) + fp−1(1). Therefore, the competitive ratio of our
mechanism is at least κ·(f−(p−1)(1)+. . .+1)+f(1)+1, which tends to κ1−f−1(1)+f(1)+1,
when p→∞. We use α to denote this competitive ratio, i.e. α = κ1−f−1(1) + f(1)+ 1. Re-
garding α as a function of f(1), we have α = κ·f(1)f(1)−1+f(1)+1 = κ+
κ
f(1)−1+(f(1)−1)+2.
Because f(1) ≥ 1, it is clear that α ≥ κ+2√κ+2 = (√κ+1)2 +1, and equality holds if
and only if f(1) =
√
κ+ 1. Therefore, the following example holds.
THEOREM 3.9. When C = 1 and f is a non-decreasing function, the competitive
ratio of ΓG is no less than (
√
κ+ 1)2 + 1.
Actually, when C ≥ h · nmax, where h ≥ 2 is an integer, the competitive ratio of ΓG
with a non-decreasing priority function f have a lower bound hh−1 · (
√
κ+ 1)2 + 1.
THEOREM 3.10. Assume C ≥ h · nmax, where h ≥ 2 is an integer, with any general
non-decreasing priority function f , the competitive ratio of ΓG is no less than
h
h−1 ·(
√
κ+
1)2 + 1.
3.3. Linear Priority Functions
Since the linear priority function has been widely used in online scheduling problems
[Porter 2004], in this subsection, we study how the proposed mechanism performswith
a linear priority function:
f(δ) = 1 + aδ,
where a is a non-negative parameter.
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THEOREM 3.11. When C = 1, the competitive ratio of ΓG with a linear priority
function is lower bounded by (
√
2κ(κ+ 1) + 32 (κ+ 1)).
PROOF. To find the lower bound, we still use Example 3.8. Now the priority is
linear, so we can represent f(δi) as (1 + aδi), here a is a constant non-negative
parameter. So in Example 3.8, social welfare obtained by the optimal solution is
∼ (f(0) + f( 1κ )+, . . . ,+f(κ−1κ )) · (1 + . . . + fp−1(1)) + fp(1) + fp−1(1) = ((1 + 0κ · a) +
(1 + 1κ · a)+, . . . ,+(1 + k−1k · a)) · (1 + (1 + a)+, . . . ,+(1 + a)p−1) + (1 + a)p + (1 + a)p−1 =
(κ+ κ−12 ·a) ·(1+(1+a)+, . . . ,+(1+a)p−1)+(1+a)p+(1+a)p−1. However, social welfare
obtained by our mechanism is ∼ fp−1(1) = (1 + a)p−1. Therefore, the competitive ratio
of our mechanism is at least (κ+ κ−12 · a) · ((1 + a)−(p−1) + . . .+ 1) + (1 + a) + 1, which
tends to (κ + κ−12 · a) · 11−(1+a)−1 + (1 + a) + 1, when p → ∞. We use β to denote this
competitive ratio, i.e. β = (κ+ κ−12 · a) · 11−(1+a)−1 + (1 + a) + 1 = κa + (κ+12 )a+ 32 (κ+ 1).
Because a ≥ 0, we have β ≥
√
2κ(κ+ 1) + 32 (κ + 1), and equality holds if and only if
a =
√
2κ
κ+1 .
It is easy to extend this result to the multi-instance case. The proof is very similar
and is omitted. We state the theorem here.
THEOREM 3.12. Assume C ≥ h · nmax, where h ≥ 2 is an integer. The competitive
ratio of ΓG with a linear priority function is lower bounded by
h
h−1 · (
√
2κ(κ+ 1)+ 32κ+
1
2 ) + 1.
3.4. Discussions
In this subsection, we make some discussions about the results we obtained so far.
First, we compare the performance of ΓG with different priority functions. With some
derivations, one can verify
(
√
2κ(κ+ 1) +
3
2
(κ+ 1)) > (κ+ 1)(1 +
1
κ
)κ + 1
and
h
h− 1 · (
√
2κ(κ+ 1) +
3
2
κ+
1
2
) + 1 >
h
h− 1 ·
χ
1− χ−1/κ + 1.
This observation suggests that, the greedy mechanism with an exponential priority
function performs better than that with a linear priority function.
Second, let us look at a simple model, in which each job i has unit length (li = 1) and
needs only one instance (ni = 1) to process it. And there are only one instance in the
cloud, i.e. C = nmax = 1. This is a special case in our general model, so all our theorems
apply. For this simple case, we have the following corollary.
COROLLARY 3.13. For the simple case, ΓG with an exponential priority function can
achieve a competitive ratio of 5.
Corollary 3.13 can be directly derived from Theorem 3.6. Note that in the simple
case, κ = 1, and we choose χ = 2 to have a 5-competitive mechanism. The results
accord with Theorem 8 in [Hajiaghayi et al. 2005].
4. A DYNAMIC PROGRAM BASED MECHANISM
The mechanism studied in previous section takes a simple greedy approach to select
a set of valuable jobs from all the feasible jobs at each critical time point. It is easy
to see that, given the virtual value v′i and the demanded instances ni of each feasible
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job and the capacity C of the cloud, a better approach is to use the dynamic program
designed for the knapsack problem to select a set of most valuable jobs. In this section,
we design such a mechanism, denoted as ΓD.
As shown in Algorithm 2, the allocation rule of ΓD is based a dynamic program.
Its payment rule is the same as the previous greedy mechanism: charge each agent
according to his/her critical value. In the remaining part of this section, we prove a
tight competitive bound (Theorem 4.2) for ΓD, the first step of which is to lower bound
the competitive ratio of the mechanism (Lemma 4.1) .
ALGORITHM 2: The allocation rule of ΓD
for all critical time point t in the ascending order do
JF ← JF (t);
if JF 6= ∅ then
For each i ∈ JF , update the virtue value v
′
i = vi · χ
δi ;
Using the dynamic programming algorithm, find the most valuable (in terms of v′i) set
of jobs, denoted as St;
Run St;
else
Output ∅;
end
end
LEMMA 4.1. The competitive ratio of ΓD is at least nmax · χ1−χ−1/κ + 1.
PROOF. We prove this by an example. For the convenience of analysis, we assume
κ is an integer and lmin = 1. In our example, C = h · nmax, and there are two types of
jobs: long and short. The length of long jobs is κ, while the length of short jobs is 1.
The long jobs are released by groups. Let p be a large integer, ǫ and there are p groups
of long jobs.
The first “long-job” group (denoted as J l0) consists of h long jobs whose types are
θl0 = (0, κ, nmax, κ, 1).
The (i+1)-th “long-job” group (denoted as J li ) consists of h long jobs whose types are
θli = (i(κ− ǫ), (i + 1)κ, nmax, κ, χi), here p− 2 ≥ i ≥ 1.
The p-th “long-job” group (denoted as J lp−1) consists of h long jobs whose type are
θli = ((p− 1)(κ− ǫ), (p+ 2)κ, nmax, κ, χi).
Here, ǫ are small constants satisfying pǫ≪ 1.
The short jobs are released by queues, and there are h · nmax queues of short jobs. In
each queue, there are pκ short jobs released one by one.
In the k-th “short-job” queue (denoted as Jsj ), we have such jobs: the (j + 1)-th short
job in the k-th “short-job” queue is θskj = (1−pǫ−kδ+j, 1−pǫ−kδ+j+1, 1, 1, χ
1−pǫ−kδ+j
κ −
δ
pκ ), for j = 0, 1, . . . , pκ− 1.
Here, h · nmax · δ ≪ ǫ.
It can be verified that only group J lp−1 can be completed in our mechanism, with a
social welfare ∼ h ·χp−1. While in optimal solution, all the short jobs will be completed,
and after that, group J lp−1 will be completed successively, with a social welfare ∼ h ·
nmax(1 + χ
1/κ+, . . . ,+χp−1/κ + χp) + h · χp−1. Therefore, the competitive ratio of our
mechanism is at least ∼ nmax · (χ−p+1 +χ−p+1+1/κ+, . . . ,+χ1−1/κ+χ) + 1, which tends
to nmax · χ1−χ−1/κ + 1, when p→∞.
THEOREM 4.2. The mechanism ΓD has a competitive ratio of nmax · χ
1−χ−
1
κ
+ 1.
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PROOF. From Lemma 4.1, we know that nmax · χ
1−χ−
1
κ
+ 1 is a competitive lower
bound of ΓD, we now prove that it is also an upper bound. We will still charge the
values of winning jobs in an optimal solution OPT to winning jobs in our algorithm.
For any winning agent i in OPT, if she is also a winner in our algorithm, then her
value is charged to herself. Otherwise, consider the time t at which i is allocated the
instances in OPT. At this time, our algorithm allocates at least C − ni + 1 instances to
other jobs, since i is not allocated. We use Ji to denote the set of jobs that are active at
time t in our algorithm. We give the following claim.
Claim 1. Jobs in Ji have a total value (in terms of v
′
j) of at least
C
ninmax
vi.
We first prove this claim. We use Vi to denote this total value. It is clear that when
ni ≥
√
C the conclusion holds, since Vi ≥ vi and Cninmax ≤ 1. So in the following, we
assume ni <
√
C. When ni = 1, then our algorithm allocates all the instances to Ji,
and there are at least ⌈ Cnmax ⌉ jobs in Ji, since otherwise i will be allocated. Besides,
each job j ∈ Ji has a value no less that vi (in terms of v′j). Otherwise j will be replaced
by i. Therefore Vi ≥ ⌈ Cnmax ⌉vi ≥ Cnmax vi = Cninmax vi.
When ni ≥ 2, we assume that there are η jobs in Ji whose size is no smaller than ni.
Each of these job has a value greater than vi. There are at least C − ni + 1 − η · nmax
instances allocated to jobs whose size is smaller than ni. Since all the njs are
integer, there are at least ⌈C−ni+1−η·nmaxni−1 ⌉ small jobs. We can combine these small
jobs to at least ⌈C−ni+1−η·nmax2(ni−1) ⌉ large jobs, each has a size larger than ni We
make this combination in the following way: Giving each job a label which from
1 to ⌈C−ni+1−η·nmaxni−1 ⌉. Starting from the first job, we use as few jobs as possible to
combine them to a large job which has size no less than ni. Each time we have a
waste of at most ni − 2 size, since every small job has a size no more than ni − 1.
Therefore we get at least ⌈C−ni+1−η·nmax2(ni−1) ⌉ large jobs, and each has a value larger
than vi, which implies that Vi ≥ ⌈C−ni+1−η·nmax2(ni−1) + η⌉vi. If 2(ni − 1) ≤ nmax,
then Vi ≥ ⌈C−ni+1−η·nmax2(ni−1) + η⌉vi ≥ ⌈
C− 1
2
nmax
nmax
⌉vi ≥ ⌈ C2nmax ⌉vi ≥ ⌈ Cninmax ⌉vi.
Otherwise, if 2(ni − 1) > nmax, then Vi ≥ ⌈C−ni+12(ni−1) ⌉vi ≥ ⌈ Cninmax ⌉vi, since
(C − ni + 1)ninmax ≥ ninmaxC − 2C(ni − 1) ≥ 2C(ni − 1), where the first in-
equality holds by nmax2 + 1 < ni <
√
C), and the second inequality holds by nmax ≥ ni.
This complete the proof of Claim 1.
We continue the proof of Theorem 4.2. We first temporarily charge the value of i to all
the jobs in Ji in proportion with their values, and each job j ∈ Ji is temporarily charged
v′j
Vi
vi (≤ ninmaxC v′j by Claim 1). A job j ∈ Ji might be interrupted in our algorithm. If she
is not interrupted, then it is finally charged
v′j
Vi
vi. If she is interrupted at time t
′, we use
Jint to denote all these jobs that are interrupted at t
′. We then pass all the temporary
charge of j ∈ Jint to jobs that are newly allocated at t′ also in proportion with their
values, and other jobs in Ji\Jint keep their temporary charge. Note that by the dynamic
programming algorithm the total value of new allocated jobs is no less than that of the
interrupted jobs. Therefore, after the interruption, each job j has a temporary charge
of at most ninmaxC v
′
j . We continue this chain until all the temporary charge is finally
charged. We now calculate the maximum total value charged to a agent j with value
vj who wins at time t in our algorithm.
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If job j is completed in OPT , there is a charge of vj . Divide all jobs in OPT whose
value is charged to j to different groups according to their start time in OPT by the
following rule:
Consider a job i in OPT whose value is charged to j. Let t′ = t − σi be the time at
which job i receives an allocation in OPT , then we say i is in group σi. It is clear from
the mechanism that σi > −lj.
When σi ≤ 0, it is easy to see that, the value charged to j by job i is at most
χ−σi/lj · ninmaxC vj . Thus, the total charge from group σi is at most
∑
i
ninmax
C vjχ
−σi/lj ≤
nmaxχ
−σi/ljvj , since if we use Numberi to denote the number of jobs whose size is ni in
group σi, then
∑nmax
ni=1
ni ·Numberi ≤ C, which implies our inequality.
When σi > 0, similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1 we can that the value charged to
j by job i is at most χ−σi/κ · ninmaxC vj , and the total charge from group σi is at most∑
i
ninmax
C vjχ
−σi/κ ≤ nmaxχ−σi/κvj Also, the value of σi for any two such groups must
be apart by at least lmin = 1, so σi = −lj + i · 1, for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,+∞. Therefore, the
total charge to j is at most
vj + nmax ·
∞∑
i:σi=0
χ−
σi
κ vj + nmax ·
i:σi=−1∑
i:σi=−κ
χ
−
σi
lj vj
≤vj + nmax ·
∞∑
i:σi≥0
χ−
σi
κ vj + nmax ·
∑
i:σi<0
χ−
σi
κ vj
=(nmax · χ
1− χ− 1κ + 1)vj .
This shows that our algorithm is (nmax · χ
1−χ−
1
κ
+ 1)-competitive.
Remark 4.3. As shown in Lemma 3.4, the competitive ratio of the greedy mecha-
nism ΓG with an exponential priority function can be arbitrarily bad if there exists
some agent with ni → C. That is, its worst case performance is not guaranteed. In
contrast, the competitive ratio of ΓD is always upper bounded; in particular, it is much
better than ΓG with an exponential priority function when the demand ni of some
agent is very large and close to C. This is consistent with our intuition, since ΓD lever-
ages a more complex approach to select the most valuable jobs at each critical time
point.
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have studied the problem of online mechanism design for resource
allocation and pricing in cloud computing (RAPCC). We have shown that the optimal
online allocation for RAPCC is NP-hard. Then two kinds of DSIC online mechanisms
have been designed: the first one, which is based on a greedy allocation rule, is very
fast and has a tight competitive bound; and the second one, which is based on a dy-
namic program for allocation, is relatively computationally expensive but with a better
competitive bound when the maximum demand nmax of agents is close to the supply
(i.e., the capacity C) of the cloud provider.
There are many aspects to explore about online mechanisms for RAPCC in the fu-
ture. First, in this paper we have focused on deterministic online mechanisms. We
would like to explore randomized mechanisms in the future. Second, we have ignored
agents’ temporal strategies and assumed that they will not misreport their arrival
times and deadlines. We will take the temporal strategies into consideration. Third,
in cloud computing, both the supply (e.g., different kinds of virtual machines) of the
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provider and the demands of cloud customers can be heterogeneous, which is beyond
our current setting. We will study online mechanisms for such complex settings.
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